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TOURO LAW REVIEW
"spite," a different determination may be established during the
new trial. 1 12 6
Both the State and Federal Constitutions provide the press with
broad protection of free speech by requiring defamatory
statements to be published with "actual malice." Under the
Federal Constitution, only a showing of actual malice is
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages. However,
New York law, seems to require an additional showing of
common-law malice, finding "actual malice ... insufficient by
itself to justify an award of punitive damages .... 1127 Together,
these requirements not only reduce the "chilling effect" that large
libel judgments may have on the "full and unfettered expression
of ideas," but more importantly, 1128 these standards guarantee
that the "broad cloak of protection afforded the press under the
State and Federal Constitutions,... does not extend to the
reckless and irresponsible infliction of injury by defendant." 1129
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Polish American Immigration Relief Committee, Inc. v.
Relax1 130
(decided April 13, 1993)
Plaintiff, Polish American Immigration Relief Committee, Inc.
[hereinafter PAIRC], a Polish immigrant aid corporation, brought
suit against the magazine publisher and editor of "Relax," a
small-circulation Polish language magazine, to recover for libel
based upon the contents of a letter to the editor, and an interview,
1126. Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 480, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
226.
1127. Id. at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 226 (1993).
1128. Prozeralik, 188 A.D.2d at 186, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
1129. Id.
1130. 189 A.D.2d 370, 596 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1993).
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which were published in its February 4, 1989, issue.1 13 1 In its
defense, defendants claimed that the statements complained of
were constitutionally protected opinion under both the New York
State 113 2 and Federal 1133 Constitutions 1134 . The court held that
the statements at issue were non-actionable expressions of
opinion under both the federal and state constitutional
standards. 1135
The subject of this lawsuit was a letter written by Marian
Jablonski, a recent Polish immigrant. 1136  Mr. Jablonski
complained about his family's treatment by PAIRC and the Polish
American Congress upon their arrival to the United States. 1137 In
the letter, Mr. Jablonski referred to the plaintiffs as "thieves who
should have been put in prison long ago." 113 8 Subsequently, Mr.
Jablonski and his wife were interviewed, and Mr. Jablonski had
an opportunity to elaborate on the letter. 113 9 During the course of
that interview, Mr. Jablonski explained why he considered
PAIRC a "madhouse." 114°
1131. Id. at 371, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
1132. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section 8 provides in pertinent part: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
1133. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .... " Id.
1134. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 372, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
1135. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
1136. Id. at 371, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
1137. Id. at 371, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 756-57.
1138. Id. at 371, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
1139. Id.
1140. Id. The comments which form the basis of plaintiff's claim included
the following: "'PAIRC is a madhouse. For instance, they won't pick up
people at the airport. Last year there was nobody to meet four families.'"
Furthermore, he also stated:
As I said, I don't regret having left Poland. There's a lesson for me:
forget the PAIRC, forget the Polish American Congress, forget others.
Let them do their fund raisers that nobody understands the aim of, let
them pretend they are just and democratic, let them have their pictures
taken with whomever they choose, let them listen to national anthems. I
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2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 10 [2020], No. 3, Art. 41
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/41
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Mr. Jablonski's letter and the substance of his interview were
published in "Relax."1141 However, the magazine did not imply
that the facts and opinions stated were accurate. 1142 In fact, the
article was prefaced by a statement from the editor, Mr. Heyduk,
which stated: "[t]he text really speaks for itself, yet if anything
remains to be said, it is the institutions referred to that should say
it."1143 In addition, Mr. Heyduk notified the plaintiffs and
offered to publish an article exhibiting plaintiffs version of the
facts, but the plaintiffs failed to respond. 1144 Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs claimed that the article published constituted libel and
defamation. However, the defendants claimed that "the
statements complained of were constitutionally protected
opinion." 114 5
The court acknowledged the differing federal and state
standards used to evaluate the contents of speech alleged to be
constitutionally protected. 114 6 With respect to the federal test, the
court found that under such test, "the court must first define the
words as they are commonly understood, then determine whether
the words are subject to verification, and lastly, examine the type
of speech at issue." 1147 As the court explained, "[o]nly if the
expression fell within the category of loose, figurative, or
hyperbolic speech could the impression that an apparently
myself have found a job in my own occupation, and so I now have a
chance to move out of here and really start living on my own instead of
just treading water. The farther away from false do-gooders, the better.
Id. at 371-72, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 757. In addition, with respect to Jablonski's
claim that PAIRC pays rent for unoccupied apartments in a building that "is
rumored to be owned by the director of the PAIRC," he stated "You know
how it is. The PAIRC gets funds for immigrants from the Americans, from the
federal government, so it is better to report that all the apartments are
occupied, that rent must be paid and so on. This way business is booming." Id.
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verifiable assertion was intended, be negated." 114 8 As for the
New York standard, the court set forth the "content, tone and
purpose" test mandated by the New York State Constitution. 114 9
However, despite the fact that the federal and state standards
differ, the court recognized that under either standard, the
dispositive issue is the same: "whether a reasonable listener
could conclude that the defendant is conveying facts." 1150
In order to determine whether the publication at issue in this
case could be understood to mean that the speaker was conveying
"facts," the court set out to distinguish between a "pure
opinion," which is not actionable under New York law, and a
"mixed opinion," which is actionable. 115 1 Relying on Gross v.
New York Times Co.,1152 the court defined a "pure opinion" as
"a statement of opinion which discloses the facts relied on, or
1148. Id. To illustrate the application of this standard, the court cited
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), where
the Supreme Court held that the term "blackmail," used during a heated public
debate, was not actionable because "[n]o reader could have thought that either
the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles reporting their words
were charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal offense." Id.
1149. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 372, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758. This test originated
in Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1986). The Steinhilber court stated that "[t]he essential task is to decide
whether the words complained of, considered in the context of the entire
communication and of the circumstances in which they were spoken or written,
may be reasonably understood as implying the assertion of undisclosed facts
justifying the opinion." Id. at 290, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
1150. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 373, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
1151. Id. at 374, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 758. In Steinldlber, the New York Court
of Appeals set forth the reasoning behind this distinction. The court stated that
"[ain expression of pure opinion is not actionable. It receives the Federal
constitutional protection accorded to the expression of ideas, no matter how
vituperative or unreasonable it may be." 68 N.Y.2d at 289, 501 N.E.2d at
552, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (citations omitted). In contrast, "[t]he actionable
element of a 'mixed opinion' is not the false opinion itself - it is the implication
that the speaker knows certain facts, unknown to his audience, which support
his opinion and are detrimental to the person about whom he is speaking." Id.
at 290, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 904 (citations omitted).
1152. 180 A.D.2d 308, 587 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1st Dep't 1992), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, No. 178, 1993 WL 41949 (N.Y, Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1993).
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does not suggest that it is based on undisclosed facts," 1153 and a
"mixed opinion" as one which is "published with actual malice
as to the facts underlying the opinion," and therefore
actionable. 1154
The court found the words at issue here to be "pure opinion,"
and therefore, constitutionally permissible under the State and
Federal Constitutions. 1155 It characterized the statements as
"rhetorical hyperbole and vigorous epithet,"1156 and concluded
that "a reasonable reader would not interpret the expressions as
factual." 1157 In reaching its decision, the court focused on the
fact that the publication in question was based upon a letter
written to the editor of a magazine. 1158 In the court's opinion,
this fact assures that "[n] o reasonable person would conclude that
PAIRC was literally a 'madhouse,' or that actual criminality is
1153. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758. See also John Grace
& Co. v. Todd Assocs., 188 A.D.2d 585, 585-86, 591 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (2d
Dep't 1992) (holding engineering company's report which indicated that
plaintiff was responsible for project delays to be pure opinion since the
expressions in the report "were adequately supported by the statement of the
underlying facts"(citations omitted)); Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,
778 F.2d 711, 718 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that a cartoon depicting a nursing
home that was closed down by state order constituted a pure opinion because
"[tihe statement was not capable of verification.").
1154. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758. See also Zeevi v.
Union Bank of Switzerland, 1993 WL 148871 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1993)
(holding statements contained in a Criminal Referral Form concerning a
former employee to be actionable as a "mixed opinion" because the statement
suggests that it is based upon underlying facts which are not disclosed).
1155. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
1156. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758. See also Old Dominion Branch No.
496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974) (finding the word "scab" used in a
union publication to describe nonunion letter carriers to constitute "merely
rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by
union members towards those who refuse to join"); Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding the word
"blackmail" as used in an article about a public figure to be "no more than
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered
Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable").
1157. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
1158. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
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charged by the epithets 'thieves' and 'false do-gooders.'" 1159 In
addition, the court took into account the underlying free speech
considerations involved in situations of this kind, and the
importance of encouraging a public forum. 1160
It has often been noted that the New York test is broader than
the federal test. 116 1 The federal test first requires a determination
of "whether challenged expression. . . would reasonably appear
to state or imply assertions of objective fact[,I" and second, the
determination of "the impression created by the words used as
well as the general tenor of the expression, from the point of
view of the reasonable person." 1162 In contrast, the state test
examines "the content of the whole communication, its tone and
apparent purpose."1 163 In discussing the distinction between the
two tests, the Immuno AG. court observed that by "[ilsolating
challenged speech and first extracting its express and implied
factual statements, without knowing the full context in which they
were uttered," as required under federal law, an application of
the federal test "may result in identifying many more implied
factual assertions than would a reasonable person encountering
that expression in context." 1164
Nevertheless, while the two tests diverge somewhat, the focus
of the inquiry under both standards are the same: "whether a
reasonable listener could conclude that the defendant is conveying
1159. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
1160. Id. at 375-76, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 359 (citing Immuno AG. v. Moor-
Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 255, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1281-82, 566 N.Y.S.2d
906, 917-18 (1991) (discussing the public function of letters to the editor)).
1161. See Imunuuo AG., 77 "N.Y.2d at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 914 (stating that "'protection afforded by the guarantees of free
press and speech in the New York Constitution is often broader than the
minimum required by' the Federal Constitution") (citing O'Neill v. Oakgrove
Constr., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 529 n.3, 523 N.E.2d 277, 280 n.3, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1,
4 n.3 (1988)); 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 145,
603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992) (stating that the federal
test is narrower).
1162. Immuno AG., 77 N.Y.2d at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 909-10.
1163. Id. at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
1164. Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
1994] 1011
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 10 [2020], No. 3, Art. 41
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/41
TOURO LAW REVIEW
facts." 1165 Moreover, as is demonstrated by the case law, both
tests often yield the same result. 1166 Thus, as long as an
offensive utterance appears to communicate facts, it will be
actionable under both state and federal law.
1165. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 373, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (citations omitted).
1166. See, e.g., 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130,
145, 603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992) (finding statements
made at a public hearing were not actionable defamation under Federal or State
Constitutions); McGill v. Parker, 179 A.D.2d 98, 107-09, 582 N.Y.S.2d 91,
97-98 (1st Dep't 1992) (finding statements published in pamphlets and leaflets
regarding the treatment of New York City carriage horses considered protected
opinion under federal and state law).
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